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LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN INDIANA:
SOME OBSERVATIONS AND A SUGGESTION
Howard D. Hamilton*
Joseph E. Beardsleyt
Carleton C. Coatst
Introduction
The establishment of an interim legislative committee on reapportionment
at the 1959 session of the Indiana General Assembly presages a long overdue
reapportionment of the Indiana legislature.' One might surmise that this action
was taken because of the imminence of the next federal decennial census, but
the federal census has no bearing on the matter because the venerable Indiana
Constitution stipulates that apportionments of the legislature shall be based on
a special state-administered census.'
It is unlikely that the legislature will reapportion itself at the 1961 biennial
session. It may simply take no action, as it has done consistently since 1927.
Or- more likely- it may enact a statute or propose a constitutional amend-
ment as the prelude to reapportionment in the near future. In the latter event,
actual reapportionment would not occur before the 1965 session, because an
amendment to the constitution must be passed by two successive general assem-
blies and then be ratified in a popular referendum.' It seems evident, however,
that the General Assembly, which has dodged this hot potato for years, now is
at the end of the line and in 1961 will have to come to grips with this complex
and explosive problem.
I. AN UNREPRESENTATIVE LEGISLATURE
To call the Indiana legislature a representative assembly seems a travesty
in view of the gross disparities in the population of the districts. On the basis
of 1960 population estimates calculated by the writers,4 one House district
(Parke) has a population of 14,700, whereas another (Marion-Johnson) has
729,000. One Senate district (Clay-Parke) has a population of 40,000, while
another Senate district (Marion-Johnson) has 729,000. The populations of
each of the districts are shown in the accompanying Maps 1 and 2 in the Ap-
pendix. It may be observed that four House districts have populations in excess
of 200,000, while four others have 20,000 or less. The average population per
representative is 46,856, but only a few districts approximate that figure.
Eighteen districts with twenty-six representatives exceed the ratio of represen-
tation by more than 50% and four districts have less than 50% of the ratio.
Comparable inequality prevails in the Senate districts. Five Senate districts ex-
ceed 200,000, while three have less than 50,000. Most districts deviate from
the ratio of representation (93,712) by more than 50%.
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Indiana State Teachers College.
t Student assistant authors.
1 IND. ACTS 1959, ch. 410.
2 IND. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
3 IND. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
4 These estimates are projections of the July 1, 1957 estimates for each county and major
city prepared by the Indiana Department of Health. The reliability of the estimates has been
sustained by recent special censuses in some large cities including Indianapolis.
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Comparison of district populations is complicated by two factors: some
multimember districts (two Senate and nine House) and the "joint districts."
The degree of malrepresentation shown is somewhat exaggerated by the "joint
districts," an unusual system of dual districts in which a second district is super-
imposed on the general districting pattern. Thus Marion County constitutes a
House district with" eleven members and with Johnson County comprises a
"joint district" with one member. Similarly, Vigo County is a Senate district
while Vigo and Sullivan Counties constitute another Senate district. The House
and Senate districts with populations in excess.of 300,000 are such "joint dis-
tricts." 5 This dual district arrangement - to the writers' knowledge unique -
has prevailed in Indiana for a century. It may have been devised to afford more
equitable representation without dividing counties by giving fractional represen-
tation to counties which had a population substantially in excess of the ratio of
representation but not entitled to a full additional representative or senator.
The joint districts make impossible any precise comparison of the repre-
sentation ratios of those areas of the state with the other districts. In an attempt
to make a comparison, some publications have compared the amount of repre-
sentation for each county, arbitrarily prorating joint senators and representatives
and those in multicounty districts. Thus, it is stated that Lake County is entitled,
on the basis of its population, to 11.46 representatives and actually has 5.5, in-
cluding one-half of the joint representative. That analysis appears specious.
Does Vanderburgh County really have three representatives, three and one-third,
or four? What bearing does the residence of the representative have? That
analysis is particularly dubious when applied to ordinary multicounty districts.
Thus, it may be said that Henry County with 53,800 population has one-half
a representative and is slightly under-represented while Rush County with only
20,600 also has one-half a representative and is greatly over-represented. Since
those counties comprise a district how can the residents of Rush County have
any more or less representation than the residents of Henry County? The fallacy
of such analysis is the premise that counties are units of representation; the actual
units are districts which in some instances coincide with one county.
The pattern of malrepresentation in this state is conspicuously different
from that in several states where one or two great metropolitan areas are grossly
under-represented and "outstate," "downstate," or "upstate" is correspondingly
over-represented. This difference, of course, is attributable to the absence of any
great metropolitan center containing upward of half of the state's population.
Indiana's largest city has only 10% and its metropolitan area less than 15% of
the state's population. However there is a distinct regional pattern. The block
of six House districts containing twelve counties and comprising the southeastern
portion of the state have an aggregate of 209,000 population and six House
seats, the same number as the Lake and Lake-Porter districts with a population
of 594,000. In this state, as elsewhere, representation in the legislature varies
5 The term "joint district" is used loosely by some people to designate any multi-county
district. The writers apply it only to the dual districts.
6 See, e.g., INDIANA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE PROBLEM OF REAPPORTIONING SEATS
IN THE INDIANA LEGISLATURE (1947).
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inversely with population density. Each of the metropolitan areas is under-
represented except one which has had a static population for several decades.
On the basis of the 1950 census, the nine standard metropolitan areas (whose
rate of population growth is nearly twice that of the rest of the state) had a
ratio of representation in the House of 1:52,790 while the ratio for the balance
of the state was 1:32,693.' The extent of underrepresentation of the ten most
populous counties is shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4 below.
II. COMPARISON WITH OTHER LEGISLATURES
The unrepresentative character of the General Assembly does not distin-
guish it from most of the other legislatures. Numerous surveys have documented
and numerous articles and pamphlets have inveighed against the state "houses
of misrepresentatives." One by the United States Conference of Mayors dis-
dosed that in 1947 residents of urban areas (about 70% of our population)
elected only 25% of the state legislators.' Some states have extremes in district
populations greater than those in Indiana. Thus one Connecticut district with
a population of 592 has representation equal to another with 177,397 inhabi-
tants. In Nevada one house district has 614 inhabitants while another has
50,205. Such fantastic disparities are attributable to four types of apportionment
rules in state constitutions: (1) provisions which grant equal representation to
political subdivisions, such as each "town" in some New England states and
each county in Nevada, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Wyoming; (2) provi-
sions which limit the amount of representation of any subdivision, like the Rhode
Island maximum of six senators from any city and the county maximum of three
representatives in Florida and one senator in California; (3) provisions which
fix the membership total for legislative chambers and guarantee representation
to each county, as in Kansas, or to each town, as in Vermont; (4) provisions
which freeze the districts in the constitution, as for both chambers in Delaware
and one chamber in Arizona, Michigan, and Mississippi.' In some states the
disparities are attributable to failure to reapportion for many years. A recent
pamphlet on this subject is appropriately titled Government by Minority."0
One study has measured the representativeness of the ninety-seven legisla-
tive assemblies by calculating the minimum percentage of population in districts
needed to elect a majority of the members as of 1955. For the Indiana House
the figure was 37% and for the Senate 39%. By that yardstick, the Indiana
Senate ranked sixteenth and the Indiana House ranked twenty-fourth in repre-
sentativeness.1 1 A comparison of Indianas smallest and largest districts popu-
lation-wise with those in the other states also indicates that the Indiana legislature
is near the middle. In one important respect Indiana is atypical: all but six
7 REIDEL, INDIANA CITIZENSHIP CLEARING HOUSE, HOOSIERS GO TO THE POLLS, 14
(1956).
8 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE (1947).
9 Details may be found in the biennial editions of COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
Boox OF THE STATES, and numerous pamphlets such as AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASS'N,
MINORITY RULE: CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY (1958); DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CIO,
GOVERNMENT BY MINORITY (1955).
10 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CIO, supra note 9.
11 Dauer & Kelsay, Unrepresentative States, 44 NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 571-75 (1955).
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states have reapportioned one or both chambers since the last reapportionment
in Indiana. 2
III. INDIANA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Malrepresentation in Indiana is not attributable to any constitutional pro-
visions; the democratic ideal of equality of representation has pervaded the
fundamental law of Indiana from the beginning. The famous Northwest Ordi-
nance, under which the territorial government was organized, stated: "The
inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits... of a
proportionate representation of the people in the legislature. . . ."" Indeed,
the Indiana constitutional fathers were so concerned about equality of repre-
sentation that they were not content to wait for the decennial federal census. The
constitution of 1816 specified that the legislature should reapportion every five
years on the basis of a special census to be taken of adult males over the age of
twenty-one. 4 The 1851 constitution changed the frequency to six years in or-
der to mesh with biennial legislative sessions. An amendment in 1881 deleted
the adjective "white," thereby making the state constitution consistent with Negro
emancipation and the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the federal
constitution. Since that date the brief apportionment provisions of article IV
have read as follows: 5
Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall at its second session after
the adoption of this Constitution, and every sixth year thereafter,
cause an enumeration to be made of all male inhabitants over the
age of twenty-one years.
Sec. 5. The number of Senators and Representatives shall, at
the session next following each period making such enumeration,
be fixed by law, and apportioned among the several counties, ac-
cording to the number of male inhabitants, above twenty-one years
of age in each....
Sec. 6. A Senatorial or Representative District, where more
than one county shall constitute a district, shall be composed of con-
tiguous counties; and no county, for Senatorial apportionment, shall
ever be divided.
The one inconsistent, undemocratic, and unique element is the reference
to adult males, called "polls" in local parlance, as the basis for apportionment,
thereby affronting the fair sex. Numerous scholars have commented and a cir-
cuit court of Indiana has ruled that this contradicts the nineteenth amendment,
the female suffrage provision of the national constitution.'6 While this feature
hardly distorts the pattern of representation, it has incensed -the feminists, and
has created an amazing and formidable obstacle to reapportionment since 1921.
Repeated efforts to correct this anachronism and remove the slight to feminine
12 Alabama, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Vermont, and Delaware. Delaware never
reapportions because the districts are specified in its constitution. DEL. CONST. art 2, § 2.
13 CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, AN ORDINANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERRITORY
OF THE UNITED STATES, NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO, July 13, 1787. This provision
was no accident. Jefferson, its principal architect, had inveighed against inequality of rep-
resentation in his native Virginia.
14 IND. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1816).
15 IND. CONST. art IV, §§ 4-6.
16 Polling v. Woods, Cause No. 5899, Marion Circuit Court (March 1955).
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feelings have failed. The legislature in the sessions of 1919 and 1921 passed a
resolution to amend the constitution to change the apportionment base to votes
cast for secretary of state in 1924 and every six years thereafter, but the proposal
was rejected by the electorate. A second effort by the legislature also failed at
the referendum stage. The last attempt was in 1937, but the following legisla-
ture failed to act on the resolution. So Indiana continues to enjoy the quaint
distinction of being the only state which apportions its legislature on the basis
of adult males.
IV. GERRYMANDERING AND LITIGATION
Despite the clear mandate of the Indiana constitution, the apportionnent
acts have not reflected adherence to the policy of equal representation. During
the period of the first constitution, apportionments became a partisan issue with
its inevitable consequence - gerrymandering." The practice continued under
the 1851 Constitution, and became so flagrant that five of the twelve apportion-
ment acts between 1851 and 1921 were held unconstitutional."8 Professor Robert
Seltzer states that the maps used by the legislature frequently contained not the
number of "polls" in each county but election statistics. Furthermore, apportion-
ment bills frequently were indexed in legislative journals and statutes as "the
gerrymander of !T" The last apportionment was in 1921; hence since
1927 the legislature has defaulted on its constitutional mandate and population
trends have rendered the forty-year-old districts (the apportionment was based
on a 1919 enumeration) grossly unequal and unrepresentative. Thus we have
the "silent gerrymander." One commentator has summed it up: "the legisla-
ture may be said to have progressed from a policy of compliance in form but not
in fact to the constitutional mandate to a policy of no compliance whatever." "
When faced with litigation challenging gerrymandered apportionments, the
Indiana Supreme Court did not duck behind the "political question" blind as
have the United States Supreme Court and the courts in several states, which
have avoided this hot potato by ruling that apportionment is a political question,
exclusively a prerogative of the legislature, and any court interference would
violate the doctrine of separation of powers. "Courts ought not enter this politi-
cal thicket" were the picturesque words of Justice Frankfurter in the famous
case of Colegrove v. Green," rejecting a suit to invalidate an old and grossly
inequitable congressional districting law of Illinois, as an alleged denial of equal
protection of the laws.
Conceding that courts have no power to district, the Indiana court asserted
that the question of whether an apportionment law is in conformity with the
constitution is a judicial matter, and proceeded to declare the apportionment
acts of 1891 and 1879 unconstitutional because of flagrant gerrymandering, in
17 A detailed account of the gerrymandering is contained in Seltzer, Rotten Boroughism
in Indiana, 1952 (unpublished thesis in Indiana University Library).
18 Apportionment laws were enacted in 1857, 1867, 1879, 1885, 1891, 1893, 1895, 1897,
1903, 1915, and 1921. The acts of 1879, 1891, 1893, 1895, and 1903 were held invalid.
Citations to cases are below.
19 See, e.g., Index, IND. AcTs of 1915.
20 Note, Reapportionment of the Indiana Legislature: Judicial Compulsion of Legislative
Duty, 32 IND. L.J. 503 (1957).
21 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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the case of Parker v. State ex rel. Powell.2 It adhered to that view in subsequent
cases invalidating three other apportionment laws.2" It has flinched only on one
occasion: when presented with a challenge of the only apportionment law then
on the statute books. Then the court denied a remedy to avoid leaving the state
with no districts and thereby creating what the court regarded as a worse evil
election of all legislators at large.
In adjudicating apportionment cases, the court read into the Indiana con-
stitution the standard of equal representation, a requirement not explicitly there,
because the Indiana constitution does not contain the familiar phrase "compact,
contiguous districts, as nearly equal in population as practicable." The court
stated that sections 4, 5, and 6 together clearly indicate two objectives: county
representation and proportionate popular representation. "To secure the fullest
possible local county representation with the nearest proportionate representa-
tion of the voters in each county is the approximate result to be reached by these
two requirements of the constitution." 25
A prominent element of the "political question" viewpoint is that a court
is powerless to afford a litigant any effective remedy, because if it should strike
down an apportionment statute, it could not compel the legislature to enact an-
other one - not to mention an honest one, and the likely result would be no
districting law and confusion compounded." To this argument, the Indiana
court found a facile answer: when an apportionment act is invalidated, the last
preceding valid apportionment law is revived." And if the preceding apportion-
ment was repealed, even in a separate statute, on the presumption that the suc-
cessor law would be valid, the repealed statute is revived.2" But if there is no
other apportionment law, the court will not strike down the existing one, be-
cause there always must be an apportionment law to effectuate the intent of
the constitution.29
Two other significant holdings were that when an apportionment statute
delegates to a county board of commissioners the responsibility for drawing dis-
tricts in a multimember county, the board possesses legislative discretion," and
that only one valid apportionment act may be enacted on the basis of each sex-
tennial census.3 The latter decision was to thwart repeated gerrymandering by
the legislature. Evidently the election of 1894 had reversed political fortunes;
the 1895 legislature proceeded to repeal the 1893 apportionment and substitute
another. The court found that both were gerrymandered and declared the law
of 1885 operative.
22 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836 (1892).
23 Denny v. State ex. tel Basler, 144 Ind. 403, 42 N.E. 929 (1896) (holding acts of
1893 and 1895 invalid); Brooks v. State ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904)(holding the act of 1903 invalid).
24 Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 44 N.E. 37 (1898).
25 Denny v. State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 403, 42 N.E. 929 (1896). The court held the
apportionment invalid because of "joint districts" which the court regarded as gerrymandering.
26 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
27 Parker v. State ex reL Powell, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836 (1892).
28 Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 44 N.E. 37 (1898).
29 Fesler v. Brayton, supra note 28.
30 Board v. Jewett, 184 Ind. 63, 110 N.E. 553 (1915).
31 Denny v. State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 403, 42 N.E. 929 (1896).
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V. COMPULSION OF LEGISLATIVE DUTY
The inaction of the legislature since 1921 has produced the "silent gerry-
mander" and posed the familiar problem of how to persuade or compel the
legislature to perform its clear constitutional duty - how to get the lawmakers
to obey the law. Strangely there has been no litigation in Indiana (until just re-
cently), but experience in neighboring Illinois and other states indicates that
this problem is much like the predicament of the mice who agreed it would be
fine to have a bell on the cat, but who would bell the cat?
Patently, the logical and direct remedy would be a writ of mandamus, but
American courts have discreetly and almost universally declined to mandamus
legislative bodies, with the exception that occasionally a mandamus is directed
to municipal councils and similar inferior legislative bodies. This policy of the
courts is grounded on the practical considerations of the undesirability of head-
on collisions between judicial and legislative power, the inappropriateness of the
customary judicial sanctions for enforcing court orders in such a situation, and
the difficulty of controlling the exercise of legislative discretion. The policy of
the courts is justified - or rationalized - by reference to the classical doctrine
of separation of powers: it would be improper for one branch to attempt to dic-
tate to a coordinate branch how it shall exercise its discretionary powers. Al-
though there have been no Indiana mandamus suits, the court's dictum in the
Denny case stated that courts cannot say how an apportionment shall be made,
nor even whether any apportionment shall be made.32
In this context, one where the constitution imposes a clear mandate, adher-
ence to separation of powers produces an anomaly. When a legislature violates
constitutional limitations by enacting a gerrymandered apportionment, some
courts, including Indiana's, will intervene to enforce the constitution. But when
the legislature violates a constitutional limitation by inaction, the courts will not
enforce the constitution. It would seem logical for the courts to police the legis-
lature in both situations, and in both the courts would not appear to be usurping
the legislative function."
In rejecting mandamus petitions, the courts usually have buttressed the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine with the "political question" argument, asserting that
apportionment is one of those rare matters exclusively within the prerogative of
a political branch - the legislature. The leading exposition of this argument
is the famous Illinois apportionment case, Fergus v. Marks,34 cited by courts all
over the nation. In the Colegrove case and subsequently the United States Su-
preme Court emphasized both of those traditional arguments.
Failing to secure mandamus, ingenious attempts have been made to coerce
the legislature by indirect methods, notably in Illinois where nearly every con-
ceivable tactic has been explored - all in vain. The Illinois courts refused to
32 Denny v. State ex rel. Basler, supra note 31. Similarly, the court refused to enjoin
a districting by a county board, because the board was exercising delegated legislative power
and hence not subject to judicial interference. Board v. Jewett 184 Ind. 63, 110 N.E. 553
(1915).
33 Note, Reapportionment of the Indiana Legislature: Judicial Compulsion of Legislative
Duty, 32 IND. L.J. 503 (1957).
34 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926).
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restrain payment of legislators' salaries, 5 or to grant quo warranto addressed to
the legislators,"8 and have rejected the argument that all acts of a legislature sit-
ting under an obsolete apportionment are invalid. 7 Recourse to the federal
courts also has been fruitless; federal courts have rejected the argument that
malrepresentation violates the guarantee of a republican form of government s
or is a violation of equal protection of the laws. In the Colegrove case, three jus-
tices vigorously dissented and saw merit in the equal protection argument, but a
majority elected to adhere to the "political question" position. Consequently
there appears to be scant possibility of coercing the legislature by either direct
or devious methods.
Recently, an action was brought in federal court to declare the Indiana
gross income tax unconstitutional on the ground that acts of the legislature sub-
sequent to 1927 are void because of the failure to reapportion in violation of the
state constitution and to restrain the collection of the tax. The motion to dis-
miss was granted because of the adequate legal remedy of the ballot to correct
any unrealistic apportionment, and because this was a purely state political question
and federal sovereignty must not invade this "bulwark of State sovereignty." 9
It has been suggested that reapportionment might be forced in Indiana by
attacking the 1921 apportionment act. If it were upset, the legislature very
likely would enact a substitute rather than. permit a reversion to the 1915
apportionment law and a possible cycle of suits.4" The success of this tactic is
dubious, because of the Indiana Supreme Court's inference in one case
that the challenger must have been a qualified voter at the time the challenged
law was enacted,4 because all preceding challenges were made shortly after en-
actment of the challenged apportionment - not forty years later, and, most im-
portantly, because the precedent cases involved gerrymandered apportionments
rather than an apportionment law which was fairly equitable when enacted but
has become inequitable by the passage of time. The silent gerrymander would
be an original question for the Indiana court and the authors are aware of only
one successful attack, the recent Hawaiian case of Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe.42 There
a federal court accepted the denial of equal protection argument and invalidated
an antiquated apportionment, realistically observing that the inaction of the
legislature amounted to a purposeful and systematic discrimination; biased in-
action can be as much a denial of equal protection as biased action." If this
case can be distinguished from the numerous state and federal decisions to the
35 Fergus v. Kenny, 333 IIl. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928).
36 Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930).
37 People v. Clardy, 334 Ill. 160, 165 N.E. 638 (1929).
38 Keogh v. Neely, 50 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 583 (1931).
39 Matthews v. Handley, 179 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd per curiam, 361 U.S. 127
(1959).
40 Note, Reapportionment of the Indiana Legislature: Judicial Compulsion of Legislative
Duty, 32 IND. L.J. 503 (1957).
41 Brooks v. State ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904).
42 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956).
43 In an oral ruling the court declared its intention to mandate a reapportionment. This
amazing ruling apparently was predicated on the Hawaiian Organic Act and the status of
the territorial legislature as an inferior legislative body, which was violating a duty imposed
by Congress. However, the ruling was vacated a few days later when Congress enacted a new
apportionment for Hawaii. Note, 32 IND. L.J. 503 (1957).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
contrary, it is because of the element of the Hawaiian Organic Act in which
Congress had imposed the duty of periodic apportionment on the territorial legis-
lature. It is significant that in subsequent cases challenging obsolete apportion-
ments of two states, federal courts have declined to follow Dyer, dismissing the
actions on the authority of Colegrove4
VI. THE SPECIAL CENSUS SNAFU
The absence of litigation against the silent gerrymander in Indiana may be
explained not only by the likelihood of failure, but also by its futility. If the 1921
law were upset, reversion to the 1915 law would render the legislature even less
representative. True, the legislature might be moved to action, but its substitute
apportionment would have to be based on a 1931 enumeration of adult males.
Such an apportionment would be about as unsatisfactory as the present one.
The antiquity of the venerated constitution of 1851 presents a formidable
- if not insuperable - obstacle to reapportionment. By an ironic twist of fate,
the very arrangement which was inserted in our 19th-century constitution to
assure frequent and equitable reapportionment has in the 20th century become
an obstacle to the realization of those goals. The sextennial census has relapsed
into a limbo and hence there are no satisfactory figures for a reapportionment.
The last complete census of adult males was made in 1931, but the 1933 legis-
lature failed to use it. Subsequently local officials have ceased taking the census,
apparently regarding it as useless and a waste of public funds. Probably most
local officials are blissfully unaware of this old statutory duty. In 1937, thirty
counties failed to enumerate; in 1943, only twenty-nine counties filed completed
returns. In 1949, the state auditor tried to get compliance, but five county coun-
cils refused to appropriate funds for taking it and several others did not do it.
Consequently the attorney general advised the auditor not to transmit the frag-
mentary returns to the 1951 General Assembly.45
To compound confusion, some local court orders have thwarted taking the
census. In 1937, a Marion County circuit court ruled that the county auditor
could not mandate township officials to act." In 1943, the Marion circuit court
issued a restraining order against the county auditor and some township officials.
In 1955, a successor requested a ruling and the same court issued a permanent
injunction."' It is said that the Marion circuit court ruling was based on the
premise that the adult males provision is invalid as contrary to the nineteenth
amendment."'
Consequently, since 1943 the census has been firmly stymied and the legis-
44 Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Perry v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp.
874 (N.D. Ala. 1956). See also Remney v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1951). At
this writing a federal court has accepted jurisdiction of a suit challenging an obsolete appor-
tionment law of Minnesota. The court has deferred any ruling until after the current session
of the Minnesota legislature. U.S. Court Spurs Redistricting, 47 NAT'L MUNic. REV. 57-58(1958).
45 Seltzer, op. cit. supra note 17, at 219-20.
46 Ibid.
47 Polling v. Woods, Cause No. 5899, Marion Circuit Court (March 1955). The in-junction order restates the 1943 injunction, but furnishes no rationale.
48 Letter from Mrs. Robert Ritchie, secretary of the Indiana League of Voters to the
authors. Apparently for this reason proponents of reapportionment have not appealed the
Marion County case.
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lature has had a plausible excuse for its repeated defaults. Thus we have an
Alice in Wonderland fantasy. The legislature cannot reapportion, because there
is no census of adult males, but the legislature makes no effort to encourage or
compel local officials to take the census. The local officials in turn default, be-
cause the legislature never reapportions anyway. A local court enjoins execution
of the census statute instead of mandating its performance. And around the
circle we go. Meanwhile all the time there are available complete and accurate
federal census data, but these are not - presumably cannot - be used.
The 1959 general assembly contained some legislators who were seriously
concerned about reapportionment and two strategies were proposed to surmount
this snafu. The Dennis bill, backed by the Marion County delegation, proposed
to establish a joint legislative enumeration commission, which should hire a di-
rector and make a strong effort to take an enumeration in 1961, a proper enu-
meration year.49 Because the constitution specifies an enumeration in 1855 and
every six years thereafter, it is presumed that the census can be taken only in the
proper year. The Dennis bill contained sections designed to persuade township
officials to perform their duty. As a model of public administration it was a
monstrosity, but it was a serious effort to get the "polls." The bill passed the
House easily, but was pigeonholed in the Senate which countered with a reso-
lution to establish the reapportionment study commission.
The other tactic was the Grills bill which would have created a legislative
committee which should immediately canvas the federal census of 1950 and as-
certain the number of "polls" in each county, which data should be used for a
reapportionment act in the 1959 session.50 That bill posed the nice question of
whether the federal census data could be substituted for the special census con-
templated by the constitution. A reading of the opinions in the old reapportion-
ment cases conveys the impression that it could not. However it is questionable
whether courts would strike down a fair apportionment based on the number
of "polls" shown in the federal census in today's circumstances. It would be
thwarting the purposes of the constitution by a narrow, rigid adherence to its
letter. In any event the Grills bill was pigeonholed in committee. A practical
objection to the Grills bill was that its data would have been nine years obsolete.
So why not wait until 1961 and use the fresh 1960 census? In view of the fact
that any amendment of the constitution to substitute federal census data for the
special census of "polls" cannot possibly be effective before the legislative session
of 1967, the Grills proposal merits serious consideration at the 1961 session."M
VII. PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AmENDMENTS
In recent years most discussion of reapportionment in Indiana has focused
on proposals for amending the antiquated article IV of the Indiana constitu-
tion, rather than on how to reapportion under the existing provisions. Eight
amendment proposals were introduced at the 1957 legislative session. Three pro-
49 H.B. 8, 92d SEss. (1959).
50 S.B. 21, 92d S.ss. (1959).
51 Repeated efforts by the League of Women Voters to secure such an amendment have
been rejected by the legislature, indicative of its attitude.
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posed to substitute the federal census for the special census of "polls." 2 Had that
proposal been adopted, the legislature would have been in a position in 1961 to
reapportion on the basis of the 1960 census. Another proposed to delete "male"
from section IV, thereby eliminating the ground for the Marion County injunc-
tion. 3 Another sought to force reapportionment by specifying that no session
of the general assembly would be legally constituted unless an enumeration had
been taken and reapportionment made in accordance with present constitutional
provisions.54 How that would have avoided the Marion County injunction is
not clear.
Three resolutions were versions of what their sponsors call the "federal
plan." One would have all senatorial districts made up of two contiguous coun-
ties with only one senator for each, with the House apportioned on the basis of
population.5 Another would have reversed the formula by allotting one repre-
sentative to each county and apportioning the Senate on the basis of population.6
A similar idea was a resolution to make the present Senate districts permanent,
"freezing" them in the constitution, while apportioning the House on the basis of
population."
Two significant features were present in most of those proposals. Six of
them would have substituted the federal census for the special census of "polls."
Four provided for an apportioning agency to act in the event of legislative de-
fault, an idea which previously had been regarded as radical.
Only the three "federal plan" resolutions got out of committee, and then
only because of strong outside pressure. The proposal to freeze the Senate dis-
tricts naturally passed the Senate easily, but the House committee declined to
give it a hearing. A few days before the session's end, the House commit-
tee reported out without recommendation the two other "federal plans," one
to allocate a representative to each county and one to allocate a senator to each
pair of counties. The committee acted under duress, undoubtedly to protect
itself against the charge of killing reapportionment. Both proposals were handed
down for debate simultaneously and the result was confusion incarnate until
both resolutions were tabled.
VIII. OBSTACLES TO REAPPORTIONMENT
The experience of the 1957 general assembly points up the foremost ob-
stacle to reapportionment. Even if there is general agreement in the legislature
on the need, it is difficult or impossible to agree on a specific plan. The pro-
ponents are not consolidated behind one plan and hence tend to cancel out the
respective proposals. Opponents have the stronger strategic position; they have
only to sit tight and criticize each plan. They can even pay lip-service to reap-
portionment while actually scuttling it. In the Indiana general assembly there
is not even general agreement on the desirability of reform and some of the
52 S.J. REs. 5, 90th SEss. (1957); S.J. REs. 8, 90th SESS. (1957); H.J. REs. 10, 90th
SEss. (1957).
53 H.J. RES. 3, 90th SFss. (1957).
54 S.J. RES. 14, 90th SEss. (1957).
55 H.J. RES. 8, 90th SEss. (1957).
56 H.J. RES. 16, 90th SESS. (1957).
57 S.J. REs. 1, 90th SEss. (1957).
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strongest opponents have been strategically located in the standing committees
on reapportionment.
Although one political party (Democratic) has had reapportionment in
its platform it did not pass any reapportionment legislation when it controlled
the legislature in the 1930's, and it has never controlled both chambers since
then. Actually most politicians in both parties appear unenthusiastic. Perhaps
they are uncertain how it would affect political alignments. Furthermore each
member of the legislature manifestly has a vested personal interest in the existing
pattern within which he has had electoral success.
Numerous other factors have contributed to the reapportionment snafu, in
addition to the obsolete census of "polls," and the aforementioned factors. Maps
1 and 2 (in the Appendix) clearly show that the bulk of the districts are below
the ratio of representation, particularly the House districts. Hence a fair reap-
portionment would diminish the political strength of a majority of the counties
and of the constituents of a majority of the members of the legislature. The com-
munities which would receive additional representation are principally the me-
tropolitan centers which necessarily would be at the expense of the balance of
the state. Naturally the "rural" areas are unenthusiastic about reapportionment
as they effectively control the legislature under the existing apportionment.
"Rural" is inaccurate and misleading, because it creates the popular impression
that the apportionment matter is a clash between farmers and city slickers.
Actually the beneficiaries of a fair reapportionment would be the cities of over
50,000 population. Hence the "rural" group consists principally of residents of
villages and small cities. The clash of interests is not accurately rural vs. urban;
it is more big city vs. small town, and small town residents and farmers alike
tend to view cities with a jaundiced eye.
Not to be overlooked is the vested interests of several powerfully organized
pressure groups whose influence in the Indiana general assembly is augmented
by the existing system of malrepresentation. These groups are principally the
associations of county and township officials, the farm organizations, the cham-
ber of commerce and the numerous allied trade and professional associations,
which frequently make common cause with the farm organizations in the gen-
eral assembly. A recent evaluation of the most powerful lobbyists listed the "Big
Six" and fourteen other organizations with real influence in the assembly.5" It
would appear that the strong influence of five of the "Big Six" and of twelve
of the other fourteen organizations is unjustly augmented by the present appor-
tionment. Occasionally spokesmen for some of those organizations mildly endorse
reapportionment, but significantly they support the "federal plan" which would
continue their disproportionate influence in the assembly.
Other obstacles to reapportionment are public apathy, coupled with the
disinterest or even hostility of legislators, the extreme brevity of legislative ses-
sions, and the difficult procedure for amending the constitution. It takes strong
58 The "Big Six" are the Chamber of Commerce, Farm Bureau, Motor Truck Associa-
tion, Indiana Insurers, Teachers Association, and the County and Township Officials Associa-
tion, with their respective affiliates. BUREAU OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, INDIANA UNI-
VEasrTy, APPORTONMENT AND REAPPORTIONMENT IN INDIANA: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
3-4 (1957).
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and sustained effort to push an amendment through five votes (four in the as-
sembly at different sessions and one at the polls) over a span of three or four
years. The opposition need prevail only on one vote -a fine arrangement for
minority rule. The sixty-one day limit on the biennial session also is a factor;
a harried legislature naturally is inclined to shelve the nasty matter of reappor-
tionment in order to avoid passion and to get on with pressing business.
IX. THE "FEDERAL PLAN"
The legislative study committee has been directed to study the "federal sys-
tem" of apportionment," which is the arrangement of apportioning one cham-
ber by arbitrarily assigning equal representation to each county, irrespective of
populations and presumably in perpetuity. The expression "federal plan"' is a
catchy slogan which is intended to be self-justifying because "that is the system
we use for our federal government." That argument contains two fallacies:
that the relationship of counties to the state government is the same as the rela-
tionship between the states and the national government, and that the system
of representation for one is ipso facto appropriate for the other.
As any schoolboy knows, our state-national relationship is a federal one
with state and national powers assigned in the Constitution, whereas the county-
state relationship is a unitary one, the counties being merely artificial creations
for state administrative convenience and possessing only such powers as the
legislature chooses to confer on them. The equal representation of states in the
Senate was largely a historical accident, one of the great compromises of 1787;
it is a dubious thing and not necessarily a proper model for the structure of state
legislatures. The so-called "federal plan" starts from a fallacious premise and
really begs the question; it renders a disservice by seeking to close our eyes to
an examination of the question of what should be the proper system of repre-
sentation in state legislatures.
Proponents of the "federal plan" usually describe it as basing one chamber
on population and the other on area. They really do not mean area literally, i.e.,
a representative for so many square miles. They actually want representation
per unit of local government -counties, towns, or cities. While more or less
equal representation of counties, and of towns in New England, is an old prac-
tice, only recently has it been rationalized and christened the "federal plan," and
pushed as a model.
There are three rather distinct variations of the "federal plan": (1) Equal
or nearly equal representation of towns as in Connecticut and Vermont, or of
counties as in New Jersey, California, and several states. (2) A freezing into
the constitution of the existing districting pattern - one that is obsolete and has
unconscionable disparities in population, as was done in Michigan. And (3) the
recent Illinois districting law which apportioned Senate seats to three regions of
the state; downstate, Cook County, and Chicago - to the disadvantage of Chi-
cago. Each variation has the common elements of the perpetuation of gross dis-
parities in district populations, pronounced under-representation of the metro-
politan areas, and corresponding over-representation for the rest of the state.
59 IND. ACTS 1959, ch. 410.
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Each has the common motive of retaining control of the legislature by non-
metropolitan areas, and the interest groups which benefit therefrom.
The common argument for the "federal plan" is that it is the solution to
the problem" of rural vs. urban power or the metropolitan area vs. downstate by
a "balanced legislature" in which the urban or metropolitan area will dominate
one chamber and the "rural" areas will control the other, thereby formalizing
a concurrent majorities system for legislation. It is fundamentally an anti-
democratic scheme, intended to thwart simple majority rule, and exploits the
traditional distrust and antipathy of rural and small town people toward big
cities. Significantly there was no concern for such a "balanced legislature" as
long as metropolitan areas were numerically in the minority; no concern then
to protect the minority against tyranny by the majority. Equally significant is
the fact that the "federal plan" is not sponsored by farmers only; its most vocal
proponents are some "city slickers": the chambers of commerce and allied busi-
ness associations, who prefer "rural," i.e., non-metropolitan, control of the legis-
lature.60
Observation of the "federal plan" in operation, as shown in Table 1, infra,
indicates that, in addition to preserving minority control of one chamber-its
objective - it has had two other significant results: it has increased the fre-
quency of partisan division between the governor and one chamber of the legis-
lature and it has handicapped the Democratic Party and associated interests to
the advantage of the Republican Party and associated interests. These results
are shown in the following recent elections in three states. The "federal plan"
chamber is the House in Connecticut and the Senate in Illinois and Michigan.
Table 1. The -Impact of the "Federal Plan" on Political Party
Strengths in Legislatures
Connecticut Illinois Michigan
Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem.
Election of 1956
*Popular vote (1,000's) 611 479 2,172 2,135 1,376 1,667
House seats 249 30 94 83 61 49
Senate seats 31 5 38 18 23 11
Election of 1958
*Popular vote (1,000's) 360 606 1,549 1,689 1,075 1,214
House seats 138 141 86 91 55 55
Senate seats 7 29 34 24 22 12
*The vote for the leading state office up for election: senator in Con-
necticut in 1958, treasurer in Illinois in 1958, and governor in the other
elections.
Sources: Book of the States, 1958-59; America Votes, 1956-57; Con-
gressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, 1958, no. 45; Official Vote of the
State of Illinois, 1957 and 1958.
60 The following observation about California is apropos: "Certain business interests in
the state have found it easier to make their influence felt in the legislature through senators
from rural areas. Privately owned utilities, banks, insurance companies, and other concerns
with crucial legislative programs have discovered some 'cow country' legislators more respon-
sive to their demands and less committed to contrary points of view on key social and economic
questions that are urban representatives." McHenry, Urban v.. Rural in California, 35 NAT'L
MUNIC. REv. 353-54 (1946).
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It will be observed that the Democratic Party had the greatest popular
vote in four of those six elections, but never secured a majority of the seats in
the Senates of Illinois or Michigan6 and only got a hairline majority in the
Connecticut House with a landslide popular majority. Obviously'the "federal
plan" discriminates moderately against the Democratic Party in Illinois and vi-
ciously in Michigan and Connecticut. The experience of California has been
the same; on several occasions the Democratic Party has elected the governor
and a majority of the House, but only in 1958 did it finally win the Senate.
The political consequences of the "federal plan" in those states are that a
Democratic governor normally, or invariably, faces a hostile majority in the
"federal plan" chamber, with the attendant friction and stalemate, and in the
years when the Republican Party loses the election it usually retains control of
the "federal plan" chamber.6 2 The payoff is that in the years that the Repub-
lican Party and its allied interests win the election, they control the governor-
ship and both chambers and can enact the legislation they desire; in the years
that they lose the election, they control one chamber and can block any legisla-
tion. It is difficult to see how such a system can be called just or representative
government.
Because party strength is more evenly spread over Indiana than in the
aforementioned states, the "federal plan" would have less effect on party for-
tunes. How much effect it would have would depend on the specific type of
"federal plan" and future electoral trends. To the extent that Democratic elec-
toral strength may continue to grow in metropolitan areas, any "federal plan"
would be discriminatory.
Irrespective of the degree of discrimination between parties, any "federal
plan" discriminates against metropolitan residents. The extent such would dis-
criminate in Indiana can be ascertained by calculating the representation of the
metropolitan areas under the "federal plan" resolutions considered in the 1957
general assembly. Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the data for the ten most populous
counties for each of those resolutions and for possible variations of each one.
H. J. RES. 16 proposed to allocate one House seat per county, which would
have reduced the representation of the ten most populous counties, which con-
tain about 51% of the state's population, from the present 37 5/6 seats, or 41
if the joint representatives are not pro-rated, to 10 -a corporal's guard. Some
discussions of "federal plans" have proposed keeping the House membership at
100 and granting the other eight seats to the populous counties - a small sop.
H. J. RES. 10 would have applied the "federal plan" to the Senate, thereby
reducing the representation of the metropolitan areas from the present 18 1/6,
or 22 if joint senators are not pro-rated, to only 5. Again, the Senate member-
ship might be retained at 50 and the extra four seats granted to four counties.
S. J. REs. 1 would have frozen the present Senate districts and reappor-
61 A factor in the Illinois' elections is the staggered terms of senators, but not in Michigan
where senators have two-year terms.
62 This situation has prevailed in Michigan for a decade, has generated continuous and
bitter friction and stalemates, and twice has brought the state treasury to the point -of
bankruptcy.
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Table 2. "Federal Plans" -Under Representation of Cities in the House
Seats Entitled Present Seats Under "Federal Plan"
County to in 1960 Seats 92 Member House 100 Member House
Allen 5
Delaware 2 1/3
Elkhart 2
Lake 112
LaPorte 2
Madison 2 2/3
Marion 14 2/3
St. Joseph 5
Vanderburgh 3'A
Vigo 21/3
Total 51
2
2
52
I2
l'/2
3
3 1/3
3
37 5/6*
* If joint representatives are not pro-rated, the total is 41.
tioned the House. That would slightly improve the total representation (both
chambers) of the metropolitan areas from the present 56 seats, 63 if joint rep-
resentatives and senators are not pro-rated, to 69, but distinctly less than the
76 to which they are entitled. Freezing the House and fairly apportioning the
Senate would give those areas 63 seats, essentially what they now have.
Table 3. "Federal Plans" -Under Representation of Cities in the Senate
Seats Entitled
County to in 1960
Allen 2
Delaware 1
Elkhart 1
Lake 6
LaPorte 1
Madison 1 1/3
Marion 7 1/3
St. Joseph 2-/2
Vanderburgh 2
Vigo 1
Total 25 1/6
Present
Seats
1
1
3
Y2
1 1/3
5 2
1./2
11/3
18 1/6*
Seats Under "'Federal Plan"
46 Member Senate 50 Member Senate
Y2 1
'A2 1
YA Y2
YA
YA YA
Y2
Y2
Y2
YA
Y2
5 9
* If joint senators are not pro-rated, the total is 22.
From the foregoing it is evident that the only type of "federal plan" which
would not discriminate against the metropolitan areas would be the freezing of
Senate districts. As time passes, their proportionate under-representation would
increase with a "frozen" Senate. Numerous scholars have emphasized the lack
of wisdom in freezing any pattern of representation into the constitution; it is
bound to become inequitable over time and "the dead hand of the past stands
as a legal block to reapportionment." 6
Equality of representation always has been the cardinal principle of repre-
63 Harvey, Reapportionment of State Legislatures - Legal Requirements, 17 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 364, 368 (1952).
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Table 4. "Federal Plans" - Under Representation of Cities
Aggregate Seats in Both Chambers
"Federal Plan" "Federal Plan" "Fede
Seats 92 100 46 50 Freez
Entitled Present Member Member Member Member Presen
to, 1960 Seats House House Senate Senate House
7 5 3 4 53/2 6 5 2
3 1/3 3 2 3 2 5/6 3 1/3 3
3 3 2 2 2% 2Y 3
17Y 8Y 7 8 12 12Y 11
3 2 2 2 2Y 2% 2Y
4 3 5/6 2 1/3 3 1/3 3 1/6 3 2/3 3 5/6
22 17 8 1/3 9 1/3 15 1/6 15 2/3 18 5/6
h 7! 4% 3/ 4Y 5/ 6 5Y
rgh 52 4 2/3 3 4 4 4/ 5 1/3
3 1/3 4Y 2 3 2 5/6 3 1/3 4
County
Allen
Delaware
Elkhart
Lake
LaPorte
Madison
Marion
St. Josepi
Vanderbu
Vigo
Total 35 1/6 43 1/6
ral Plan"**
Freeze
t Present
Senate
6V
3 1/3
3
14Y
2/
4
20 1/6
6%/
4 5/6
3 5/6
56 60 63 69 1/6
* If joint members are not pro-rated, the total is 63.
** The other chamber to be districted fairly on the basis of population -the Michigan
arrangement. Probably these counties would actually get somewhat less than their propor-
tionate share of seats.
sentation in the Indiana constitutions. Abandonment of that fundamental
democratic principle in favor of the "federal plan" would be an unfortunate
regression. The "federal plan" is a misnomer predicated on a patent fallacy and
is as illogical as it is unjust. The experience of states which have it does not
demonstrate that it is a superior system of representation. "One need only to
study the political history of Connecticut to see how ineffectively the federal
system works.. . inaction and stalemate is common." "e The brief experience of
Michigan has been similar. Its claim of a "balanced legislature" is spurious,
because its purpose is to throw several weights on one side of the scales. It is ut-
terly illogical to have the members of one chamber representing pastures, fish,
or stumps. As Professor Robert Seltzer states, "The writing of Senate districts
into the Indiana Constitution is a backward step. Today it is people, not land
areas, which need to be adequately represented. Legislatures must meet the
needs of all inhabitants, not just cornfields." 65
X. FEAR OF URBAN DOMINATION
The fear that an equitable redistricting would result in domination by city
groups with grievous consequences to the state has less basis in Indiana than in
many states which have gargantuan metropolises. The largest metropolitan area
of Indiana has only 15% of the state's population and the nine standard metro-
politan areas had only 45% of the state's population in 1950. This fear appears
unfounded for the foregoing reason and also because political party alignments
do not coincide with urban-rural areas. The Democratic Party has strength all
over the state and is normally the stronger party in many rural counties. Re-
64 Id., at 365. Another commentator has said, " ... the experience of states in which
one house of the legislature represents people and one pastures has hardly justified optimism
or confidence ... ." BAKER, RURAL VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL POWER 14 (1955). The fact
that it has been adopted by some states in recent years is not necessarily evidence of merit.
In every case it came after prolonged apportionment default and may well have been enacted
as the price for any reapportionment.
65 Seltzer, op. cit. supra note 17, at 273-74.
76 1/6 56*
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publican Party strength is not as widely spread, but that party is strong in most
of our large cities as well as in the towns and countryside. It long has been
dominant in Fort Wayne and Lafayette, and has carried Marion County
(Indianapolis) in most elections of the past decade. Consequently partisan
alignments in the General Assembly serve to mitigate rural-urban conflict, rather
than re-enforcing it as in some states.
Table 5. Election Results in the Ten Most Populous Counties, 1950-1958
Winning Party in Elections for Governor, Senator, or Congressman*
Co
Aller
Dela
Elkh
Lak
LaP
Mad
Mar
St. J
Van
Vigc
unty
n
Lware
art
orte
oisn
Ion
roseph
derburgh
Total
1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 All
R R R R D 4R
R R R R D 4R
R R R R D 4R
D D D D D OR
R R R R D 4R
D R D R D 2R
R R R R D 4R
D D D D D OR
R R R R D 4R
D D D D D OR
6R 4D 7R 3D 6R4D 7R 3D OR 10D 26R
5 Elections
ID
1D
ID
5D
ID
3D
1D
5D
1D
5D
24D
* The vote for governor in 1952 and 1956, for senator in 1950 and 1958, and for congress-
man in 1954.
The evenness of party competition and the strong tendency of the voters
to switch parties are shown by the electoral data for the ten most populous
counties in Table 5. During the past decade the Republican Party has had a
slight edge although the Democratic Party carried all ten counties in 1958 in
a state-wide sweep. Three counties (Lake, St. Joseph, and Vigo) consistently
have had Democratic majorities, but in 1956 the Democratic margin was nar-
row in its strongholds of Lake and St. Joseph Counties. In most counties,
notably Marion, voting has been volatile with sharp swings. Clearly, many ur-
ban Hoosiers vote independently.
Proponents of the "federal plan" frequently proclaim that a straight popu-
lation apportionment of the General Assembly would result in domination of
the state by five, six, or seven counties. The actual figure would be ten counties
which aggregate half of the state's population. This bogey presumes that the
representatives and senators from those ten counties would vote solidly to ad-
vance their interests - whatever they might be - and to injure the balance of
the state. The argument starts from the dubious premise that those ten cities
have interests which are distinctive from the interests of the other cities and the
rural areas of the state. What issues would produce a solid division of the legis-
lators from the ten most populous counties against those from the other eighty-
two counties? Labor issues? Some representatives from those ten counties vote
anti-labor (see Tables 6 and 7 below), and some of the strongest pro-labor
legislators are from other counties. Issues involving city government structure
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and powers? There are large cities outside these ten counties; also these ten
counties contain some small cities. Very little "city legislation" concerns the
powers and structures of all cities. Such legislation concerns only a class of cities
frequently only one city, although disguised as general legislation. Hence urban
representatives do not have a solid, common interest in city legislation. Rural
problems and interests? Each of the ten most populous counties - even Marion
and Lake - have very substantial rural populations which a legislator would be
loathe to antagonize. Issues involving industrial and commercial interests? Al-
though those ten counties necessarily have the greatest concentration of industry
and commerce, there are formidable industries and commerce in nearly every
corner of Indiana, and no legislator is unmindful of such interests. Furthermore
the lobbyists of industry and commerce make common cause with rural interests
in the legislature far more frequently than they oppose them.
The spectre of a dictatorship by a phalanx of legislators from the big cities
is exploded by a perusal of recent election statistics, noted above, and by analysis
of legislative voting. The writers have made a detailed analysis of the voting
behavior of the senators from those ten counties during two recent sessions, 1957
and 1951. Those sessions were selected, because the 1957 session is the most
recent one for which the journals have been published and 1951 was a peak
year of Democratic Party strength in the Senate, the membership consisting of
26 Republicans and 24 Democrats. In 1957, fourteen of the 22 senatorial seats
from the districts containing those ten counties were held by Republicans,
whereas in 1951 fifteen were held by Democrats.66 Hence the two sessions pre-
sent opposite conditions of partisan- composition. The votes on third reading
roll calls on all controversial bills and resolutions were posted and analyzed, and
are summarized in Tables 6 and 7 below. Controversial roll calls were defined
as those in which ten (20%) or more senators voted in opposition to the ma-
jority vote." This standard was applied in order to eliminate the numerous
non-controversial bills on which there naturally would be no significant difference
in the voting of the "metropolitan senators" as compared to the other senators.
Three yardsticks were used to evaluate the voting of the metropolitan sen-
ators: the frequency with which a majority of the metropolitan group voted
with a majority of the other senators, an index of cohesion of the metropolitan
senators, and an index of the likeness of the two groups. The index of cohesion
ranges from 0 to 100, with a unanimous vote being 100 and an evenly split vote
0. Thus the over-all index of cohesion of 41 for the 1957 session reflects an
average voting pattern of 15Y2 to 6,/2, and the 37 over-all index for the 1951
session reflects an average voting pattern of 15 to 7 on the controversial roll
calls.68 The index of likeness is the complement of the difference between the
66 This included six joint senators with districts including other counties. They were
included in the metropolitan group on the assumption that, irrespective of their residences,
they would vote with an eye to the residents of the large city in their districts.
67 Some scholars have used a lower test or controversial roll calls, such as 10% opposition.
Use of a lower test would produce a higher index of cohesion for the metropolitan senators
but also a higher index of likeness between the two groups.
68 Index of Cohesion = 2 (% majority vote - 50). This is the frequently used index
developed by RICE, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN POLITICs 207-10 (1928).
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percentage of affirmative votes of the two groups. 9 Thus the over-all index of
likeness of 82 in the 1957 session and of 80 in the 1951 session indicates that
the percentage of affirmative votes in the respective groups varied by 18% in
1957 and 20% in 1951.
Table 6. Analysis of the Voting of Senators from the Ten Most Populous Counties
Indiana General Assembly, 1957 Session
No. Index Concurrent Majorities Index of
Nature of Bills and Resolutions of of Metro. Senators Likeness of
Bills Cohesion and other Senators Two Groups
Agriculture & Conservation 6 52 6 86
Alcoholic Beverage Regulation 3 59 0 53
Business & Prof. Regulation 13 47 10* 75
City Government 13 33 13 89
County & Twp. Government 3 24 2 77
Criminal Law 3 35 2 87
Education 7 53 7 81
Labor 8 27 7* 85
Motor Vehicle & Traffic 5 54 5 89
Taxation & Revenue 7 39 5* 77
Miscellaneous 8 44 7* 87
All Controversial Roll Calls 76 41.4 62 81.9
* On four other roll calls the senators of one group split their votes evenly.
In Tables 6 and 7 the controversial roll calls are classified according to
subject matter, with the corresponding index of cohesion, index of likeness, and
number of concurrent majorities. It will be observed that concurrent majorities
prevailed on 62 of the 76 controversial roll calls in 1957 and on 41 of the 63
in 1951. On five other bills a group split its votes evenly. Such a record hardly
reflects a sharp clash between the metropolitan senators and their peers. Simi-
larly, the over-all index of likeness of 82 in 1957 and 80 in 1951 demonstrates
a strong similarity in the voting behavior of the two groups.
In the 1957 session only one class of bills, those pertaining to alcoholic
beverage regulation, aligned a majority of the metropolitan senators against a
majority of the non-metropolitan solons. In the 1951 session there were no
concurrent majorities on the three controversial bills pertaining to agriculture
and conservation, but, interestingly, in 1957 concurrent majorities occurred on
all six bills in that category. Hence alcoholic beverage regulation was the only
category which consistently produced a metropolitan vs. non-metropolitan pat-
tern.
Other categories in which one might anticipate such an alignment showed
scant disagreement between the two groups. Thus on the ten labor bills in both
sessions concurrent majorities prevailed nine times and one group split evenly
on-the other one. On the eighteen city government bills, seventeen concurrent
majorities occurred and one group split on the other one. On the nineteen bills
69 Index of likeness = 100 - (% affirmative vote of group A - % affirmative vote of
group B). Ricae, supra note 68, at 210-15. The summary data in Tables 6 and 7 are derived
from over 3,000 postings and about the same number of arithmetical calculations.
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Table 7. Analysis of Voting of Senators from the Ten Most Populous Counties
Indiana General Assembly, 1951 Session
No. Index Concurrent Majorities Index of
Nature of Bills and Resolutions of of Metro. Senators Likeness of
Bills Cohesion and other Senators Two Groups
Agriculture & Conservation 3 32 0 75
Business Regulation 6 47 5 83
City Government 5 33 4 84
Civil Law and Procedure 7 47 5* 81
County & Twp. Government 10 47 6 74
Criminal Law 4 17 2 86
Education 2 51 1 81
Labor 2 43 2 76
Motor Vehicles & Traffic 5 30 4 89
Taxation & Revenue 9 32 4 84
Miscellaneous 10 27 8 73
All Controversial Roll Calls 63 36.9 41 80.1
* Senators of one group split vote evenly on another bill.
relating to business and professional regulation, concurrent majorities occurred
on fifteen bills and one group split on another. For the other categories, concur-
rent majorities also were the pattern, as one might expect. The index of like-
ness was 73 or above on all categories except alcoholic beverage regulation.
The indices of cohesion among the metropolitan group were almost uni-
formly low in both sessions. Even on the alcoholic beverage bills, which elicited
the most cohesion, the group split 17 to 5. On labor bills the average vote was
14 to 9 in 1957 and 15Y to 7 2 in 1951. On city government bills the group
split on the average of 15 to 8 in both sessions, and voted with corresponding
majorities of the other group on both labor and city government bills. The me-
tropolitan group never voted solidly on anything controversial in either session.
The low indices of cohesion among the metropolitan senators, art over-all
of 41 in 1957 and 37 in 1951, furnish a sharp contrast to the indices of cohesion
among senators of the respective political parties. On the same controversial
roll calls in 1951, the Republican members displayed an index of cohesion of
87.1 and the Democrats 89.3.0
The foregoing data conclusively show that political party affiliation in the
Indiana General Assembly is a stronger influence than whether the solon hails
from a metropolitan or a "rural" district. Rural-urban, or metropolitan vs. non-
metropolitan, conflict is not a strong factor in the General Assembly. Metro-
politan senators do not vote as a phalanx, they generally divide their votes in
about the same manner as their colleagues, and the bogey of a metropolitan
dictatorship in the legislature in the event of a fair reapportionment is a myth.
70 This is consistent with the results of a similar analysis of party cohesion in the Con-
necticut legislature which reported indices between 83 and 87. Lockhart, Legislative Politics in
Connecticut, 48 Am. POL. Scr. REv. 166-73 (1954).
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These.results concur with a similar study of votes in the Illinois and Mis-
souri legislatures, which reported: "'
[G]enuine metropolitan against non-metropolitan conflict in the
Illinois and Missouri General Assemblies is rare... Further, col-
lision of urban-rural interests, as forwarded by legislators from those
two areas, is seldom found, while conflict of interests within the ur-
ban areas frequently appears in the legislature.
The reasons for the low cohesion among the metropolitan senators are
hardly obscure: the obvious one of party affiliation, which is a stronger force
in the Indiana General Assembly than in some legislatures; the irrelevance of
population density to the bulk of legislation, and the complexity of the political
and social structure of the metropolitan community which proliferates competing
interests.
The fear of urban dictatorship is the product of widespread misunderstand-
ing, a misunderstanding which is being sedulously cultivated by the proponents
of the "federal plan." Professor Gordon Baker has correctly sized up this mat-
ter: 72
While a granting of urban representation proportionate to pop-
ulation would not result in a single, cohesive urban "majority," it
could effectuate a considerable shift in the pattern of political
power. Some urban interests that formerly had little influence
would probably gain more, while others (notably those that enjoy
an advantage from an alliance with rural forces) would lose. It is
this potential shift in the power equilibrium that arouses the greatest
resistance from the elements benefiting from the status quo. That
resistance is prompted by a fear not of an urban interest, but of
certain urban interests.
XI. THE ILLINOIS CUMULATIVE VOTING SYSTEM
Anyone concerned about rural-urban conflict and fearful of big city domi-
nation of the legislature might consider the cumulative voting system in Illinois.
That system is unique in the United States, and perhaps the entire world, and
is the most significant approach to proportional representation prevailing in this
country. The essence of the system is minority party representation in every
legislative district. All House districts have three members elected simultaneously
on a ballot where the voter has the options of voting for one, two, or three
candidates. If he votes for only one candidate, that candidate is credited with
three votes; if he checks two candidates, each receives one and one-half votes
unless the voter chooses to give one candidate two votes; and if he checks three
candidates, each receives one vote.73 This enables the members of a minority
party in a district to concentrate their votes on one candidate and assure his
election.
Thus the normal result is that the majority party wins two seats and the
minority party wins one in virtually every House district. That is in marked
71 Dirge, Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in the Illinois and Missouri Legislative
Delegations, 52 Amf. POL. Sci. REv. 1052 (1958).
72 BAKER, op. cit. supra note 64, at 58-59.
73 ILL. CONST. art. 4, §§ 7-8. A detailed description and analysis is presented in Blair,
Patterns of Party Allegiance, 52 Ame. POL. Sci. REv. 123-30 (1958).
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contrast to the winner-take-all result of our customary system of single member
districts, or when electing all members on a straight plurality basis in multi-
member districts. It is nearly impossible for the majority party to take all three
seats in the Illinois district if the minority party plunks all of its votes on one
candidate. To sweep a district, the majority would have to obtain the support
of over 75% of the voters of the district -a rare feat which occasionally oc-
curs in a few districts in Chicago.
To facilitate operation of the system, the law permits political party com-
mittees in each district to determine the number of candidates to be nominated;
thus the party can avoid scattering its votes. In those districts where party
strength is about equal, both parties make two nominations; thus there are four
candidates in the fall election for three seats. In districts where party strength
is decidedly uneven, the majority makes two nominations and the minority one.
This produces "set-up" tickets in November in about half of the districts. In
that situation the real elections occur in the primaries, as they do in many other
places in the United States. Occasionally five or more nominations are made. 4
The system was incorporated in the Illinois Constitution of 1870 in order
to mitigate sectional conflict in the legislature and to assure minority party rep-
resentation.75 Prior to that time, the southern portion of the state sent solid
Democratic delegations to Springfield while the northern part sent solid Republi-
can delegations, which exacerbated sectional feelings." The intent of the cumu-
lative voting system was to make partisan loyalties mitigate rather than re-
enforce sectional loyalties. The experiment worked and today is a useful device
for mitigating Chicago-downstate friction in the legislature. At every session
about one-third of the Chicago delegation is Republican, and at least one Dem-
ocrat represents each of the suburban and downstate districts.
A recent statistical analysis of roll-call votes in the Illinois House confirms
the success of the system. That study shows that Chicago Republicans vote more
consistently with downstate Republicans than with Chicago Democrats, even on
issues directly affecting Chicago. And conversely, downstate Democrats vote
more consistently with Chicago Democrats than with downstate Republicans.
As a result, there is a very low cohesion in the voting of House members from
Chicagoland, less than 67% on three-fourths of the contested roll-calls from 1949
through 1957."
In addition to achieving its major objectives of assuring minority represen-
tation and mitigating sectional conflict, the cumulative voting system has several
other valuable results. It assures that party strength in the legislature will very
closely approximate the ratio of the state-wide vote for each party; each party
gets within two or three seats of the number its proportion of the vote merits.
Consequently the majority party always has a clear majority of the seats and is
opposed by a minority party delegation with forty percent or more of the seats,
enough to be an effective opposition. There are no landslides; the relative party
74 See table in Blair, Cumulative Voting: An Effective Electoral Device in Illinois Politics,
34 Sw. Soc. Scr. Q. 15 (1954).
75 The idea is credited to Joseph Medil, publisher of the Chicago Tribune. See GARVEY,
TaR GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF ILLINOIS 72-74 (1958).
76 See Blair, op. cit. supra note 74, at 15.
77 Dirge, op. cit. supra note 71.
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strengths necessarily fluctuate within a range of 33% and 671% and in practice
the range is between 40% and 60%. Consequently there is less turnover in per-
sonnel and in every session the bulk of the legislators are experienced."8 These
very significant merits of the system are spotlighted by the following comparison
of Illinois and Indiana statistics.
Table 8. Comparison of Cumulative Voting and
Straight Plurality Voting Systems
1956 1958
Illinois Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem.
Popular vote - percent 50 49 48 52
Members of House elected 94 83 86 91
Indiana
Popular vote - percent 55 44 43 56
Members of House elected 76 24 21 79
Two criticisms may be made of the system: the limited number of nomi-
nations, and that three-member districts necessarily are larger geographically
and in population than single-member districts, and therefore may weaken the
bond between legislator and constituent. The map of Illinois districts shows that
the average downstate district contains three or four counties, although one has
seven and some are single counties."9 Three or four counties is not an exhorbi-
tantly large district, particularly when the three representatives are likely to be
scattered about the district. From the population standpoint, none of the Illinois
districts are nearly as large as the Marion and Lake districts of Indiana. Further-
more, the bond between legislator and constitutent is strengthened by the fact
that every constituent who bothered to vote voted for at least one of the legis-
lators from his district.
Limiting nominations to three candidates in the "set-up" districts renders
the fall election superfluous, and transfers the actual election to the primaries."0
However in that situation the members of each party have a chance to cast a
significant vote in the primaries, whereas in "safe" districts under the plurality
system the election also is only a formality and at the preceding primaries only
the members of the dominant party have an opportunity to cast a significant
vote. In those Illinois districts where four or more nominations are made (half
of the districts) voters at the general election have a much wider range of choices
than voters in single-member districts.
The disadvantages do not appear nearly as consequential as the many ad-
vantages of the system. It is noted that the Illinois system continues to be one.
of those things, like the Nebraska unicameral legislature, which is frequently
admired but has never been copied. It remains virtually unknown even in ad-
jacent Indiana, and possibly would be viewed with suspicion as a dangerous
novelty - perhaps "un-American," although ninety years would appear to be
an adequate experimental period. Clearly the Illinois cumulative voting system
merits consideration as a practical system of minority representation, which
78 See the table 1 in Blair, op. cit. supra note 74.
79 See maps in Blair, op. cit. supra note 73.
80 An incidental effect of the system would appear to be the strengthening of party control
over elections and of party discipline in the legislature.
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avoids the common criticism of proportional representation as productive of
splinter parties, since it squeezes out minor parties. Significantly, when Illinois
reapportioned in 1954-55 it chose to retain cumulative voting.
XII. SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS OF MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS?
The standard system of representation in this country always has been the
single-member district, but the Indiana legislature contains several multimember
districts. Currently the Marion House district has eleven members, the Lake
district has five members, and nine other House and Senate districts have two
or more members. Under a fair apportionment, the Marion House district
would have fifteen members, the Lake district twelve, two districts would have
five members, and seven other House districts would have two, three, or four
members. Presently the constitution bars division of a county for Senate districts
but not for House districts. Briefly, 1915 to 1921, single-member districts were
universal for the House; the 1915 apportionment law directed county boards
in multimember counties to draw districts.8 '
Since a fair reapportionment would result in about twenty-one senators and
fifty-six representatives from multimember districts, which is half of the mem-
bership of the Legislature, and since amendment of the apportionment sections
of the constitution is now contemplated, the reapportionment study commission
ought to examine the question of whether multimember districts should be
continued.
Multimember districts are not unique to Indiana. A recent survey found
multimember Senate districts in sixteen states and multimember House dis-
tricts in thirty-six states. 2 Since that survey at least one state (Michigan) has
abandoned them. Their existence would appear attributable to the feeling that
a community - a city, county, or New England town - is a proper, natural
unit for representation in the legislature. That feeling is expressed in and en-
forced by numerous constitutional provisions similar to the Indiana prohibition
against dividing counties for Senate districts. Multimember districts are the
prevailing pattern in Europe because of the use of various systems of propor-
tional representation, but they are something of an anomaly in the United
States with our straight plurality elections and tradition of single-member dis-
tricts. Most American political scientists, and probably most citizens, seem to
regard the single-member district as the superior system, but Professor Maurice
Klain states that this assumption has never been intensively investigated or con-
firmed by empirical evidence.83
The following arguments have been advanced from time to time in favor
of multimember districts: (1) A natural community ought not be divided. (2)
Multimember districts have larger populations, hence a wider field from which
to draw higher quality representatives. (3) In a large multimember district the
representative may be less vulnerable to pressure groups. (4) It is theoretically
possible to get a mathematically more equitable apportionment with multi-
member districts. (5) It has been said that single-member districting offers
81 IND. ACTS. 1915, ch. 181.
82 Klain, A New Look at the Constituencies: The Need for a Recount and a Reappraisal,
49 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 1105-19 (1956).
83 Ibid.
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greater opportunity for gerrymandering. (6) The representative from the single-
member district may be more parochial than one from a large district. (7) The
representatives from a multimember district are of the same political party
under our election system, with rare exceptions, and hence will be more likely
to present a united front on behalf of the community's interests, than under a
single-member system which usually results in a partisan division among the
community's representatives.
Manifestly some of the foregoing arguments are contradictory, particularly
points six and seven. A major weakness of the argument for integral treatment
of communities is the dubious character of counties as natural communities.
Cities are more nearly communities, but it is counties which are the multi-
member districts. The argument that multimember district representatives may
be of better quality and less parochial is not confirmed by empirical observation;
in fact the evidence indicates the contrary.
The really substantial and incontrovertible argument is, in the writers'
judgment, the partisan unity of members from such districts. Indubitably this
is advantageous to any large city and probably has operated to offset partially
the effect of underrepresentation of cities. Consequently if multimember dis-
tricts were abolished, cities would suffer and justice would require that cities be
given their full, proportionate representation. To abolish multimember districts
and simultaneously short-change cities by some version of the "federal plan," as
has occurred recently in Michigan, would add insult to injury.,
The arguments for single-member districts fall into three categories: (1)
the advantages accruing from small constituencies, (2) the assertion that one-
member elections foster two-party politics, and (3) the greater opportunity for
minority party representation in delegations from populous communities. The
force of these arguments is directly proportional to the size of the alternative
multimember district. The bond between member and constituent in a single-
member district may not be significantly stronger than in a two or three-member
district, but contrast it with that between representative and constituent in a
fifteen-member district containing 700,000 residents. How can the representative
personally know many of his constituents?
A major defect of the large multimember district is the problem of intel-
ligent voting. How can the voter intelligently evaluate the merits of fifty candi-
dates in the primary of a fifteen-member district? And what of his problem in
coping with thirty names at the following election, not to mention the other offi-
ces? The situation is made to order for machine politics and even venal politics.
The machine's slate can easily carry the primary, and in the general election
the conscientious and discriminating voter is thwarted, one party slate or the
other wins. Some people defend this as "responsible party government," but the
writers' observations are that it often is irresponsible and some of the poorest
legislators are from such districts. In the marginal multi-member districts an-
other serious disadvantage is the excessive turnover; with each shift in party
fortunes every incumbent is swept out and the entire delegation changes, as in
Marion County in 1948, 1950, and 1958.
Another indictment of the multimember district is the inequitable distribu-
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tion of the seats party-wise. It is a winner-take-all arrangement, with no minor-
ity party representation. Thus in the last election in Marion County, the 111,000
Democratic votes elected twelve representatives and six senators, while 103,000
Republican votes elected not a single Republican. If that county consisted of
twelve House districts and six Senate districts, such a party sweep would be a
very remote possibility.
It is the writers' judgment that the merits of single-member districts far
outweight those of multimember districts, which have such conspicuous defects.
Multimember districts, particularly large ones, ought to be abolished. That
would pose the complex and ticklish task of drawing districts within counties
and cities, a difficult task at best with manifold opportunities for gerrymandering.
Consequently the districting function should not be assigned to the county com-
missioners, as was done in 1915, but ought to be performed by a state districting
or apportionment commission with a competent and impartial staff. The fore-
going remarks of course do not apply to the Illinois multimember districts with
the cumulative voting system.
In construing the apportionment sections of the constitution, the Indiana
Supreme Court has objected to one type of multimember district, one compris-
ing three or four counties. Such "double districts" were the basis for the court's
invalidation of the 1895 apportionment act.84 It objected to a district of three
counties with an aggregate of 22,400 "polls" which had been assigned two
senators. From the standpoint of population, i.e., "polls," the district was en-
titled to two senators, but the court stated that since not one of the three coun-
ties had enough "polls" to be entitled to a senator, it was improper to create a
district in which the residents would be permitted to participate in the election
of two senators. In addition, the court held that such a district violated the
constitutional standard of "local county representation." The court implicitly
rejected the pro-rating viewpoint. That decision seriously handicaps the task of
designing an equitable districting pattern.
XIII. DISTRICTING MODELS
To what extent is equitable representation, i.e., equality of district popu-
lations, possible with single-member districts? The writers have worked out the
districting patterns in Maps 3 and 4 in the Appendix. The estimated 1960
population for each district is shown, except in populous counties which should
contain more than one district. In the latter case the average population of
districts within a county is shown.
It will be observed that the bulk of the districts in these models have popu-
lations within 10% of the ratio of representation. Only three Senate districts
(Madison, Delaware, and Grant-Blackford) deviate more than 15% from the
ratio, but the Madison district deviates 33%.
A greater relative dispersion exists in the House districts. Seven districts
exceed the ratio of representation by more than 15% and twelve districts are
more than 15% below. Only one district is more than 20% below, but five are
more than 20% above, and one (Howard) deviates by 42%.
84 Denny v. State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929 (1896).
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Students of congressional districting have prescribed 15% as the reasonable
maximum deviation for congressional districts.8 That desirable standard is
much more difficult of achievement in legislative districting and patently is un-
attainable in Indiana on the basis of single-member districts which do not cut
across county lines.
Greater equality of district populations than in these models might be ob-
tained by three methods. One would be the creation of a few "double districts,"
i.e, composed of two or three counties and each having two senators or repre-
sentatives. Creation of a few such districts would provide very satisfactory pop-
ulation ratios, but this method is barred by the Indiana Supreme Court's decision
in the Denny case."8
Another approach would be the "joint district" device, placing some coun-
ties in two different districts. That would correct the underrepresentation for
the few large districts in Maps 3 and 4, but not the overrepresentation of the
dozen small House districts. Also, while this is an old practice in Indiana, it is
open to serious objections. It makes any logical comparison of district popula-
tions impossible, as explained above. It opens the door to endless wrangling, and
possibly gerrymandering, because there is hardly any limit to the various com-
binations that might be drawn with such "joint districts." Furthermore it runs
the risk of being declared unconstitutional, if challenged, as occurred in the
Parker case. 7
The third possibility would be to disregard county lines, partially, and have
a few districts straddling county lines. Thus the Howard County House district
(Map 3, Appendix) could be reduced to a reasonable population by attaching
a portion of that county to one of the districts in Grant County, resulting in
three districts of about 48,000 population. This approach is contrary to the
long tradition of county integrity, but it is difficult to see any genuine disadvan-
tages, beyond some additional work in printing election ballots. Within the
framework of single-member districts it really would not injure the private citi-
zen; each person has one representative, who may live in an adjacent county,
which is now a common occurrence. Possibly county officials 'Would object, but
actually they would benefit; thus Howard County officials would have two
spokesmen in the House. This approach, however, is barred by the constitution
for Senate districts and the opinions of the Indiana Supreme Court in the re-
apportionment cases, which emphasized county integrity, suggest that any such
House districts might be held unconstitutional.
Consequently it appears that the models in Maps 3 and 4 are about the
closest possibility to equal representation within the limits of the present provi-
sions of the constitution, without resorting to the confusion of dual "joint dis-
tricts." Although the disparities are not horrendous, it might be desirable to
amend the constitution to permit greater equality. Such an amendment should
delete the prohibition against splitting counties for Senate districts and authorize
the creation of districts across county lines as well as within a county. The amend-
85. The standard proposed by a committee of the American Political Science Association
and sponsored in Congress as the well-known Cellar resolution. See Cellar, Congressional Ap-
portionment - Past, Present, and Future, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 268, 274 (1952).
86 Denny v. State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929 (1896).
87 Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836 (1892).
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ment might be drafted in a manner which would permit adoption of the Illinois
cumulative voting system.
The default of the Indiana legislature and similar defaults by legislatures
of other states points up the problem of securing regular and equitable reappor-
tionments. Nineteenth-century state constitutions universally vested this function
in the legislature and mandated reapportionment at specified intervals. The
assumption that the legislature would honor its obligation has proved wrong in
the twentieth century, when our society has become more diversified and com-
plex and greater pressures have come into play. There are three obvious reasons
why legislatures default: the members personally have a strong vested interest
in the existing districting pattern, powerful interest groups also have vested in-
terests in the existing apportionment, and when a legislature is sincerely inter-
ested in performing its duty it often cannot reach agreement on any reapportion-
ment. Under present circumstances it is almost utopian to expect the legislature
to reapportion regularly.
To correct this situation some states have amended their constitution in
recent years to establish a reapportionment commission, usually empowered to
reapportion if the legislature defaults. The commission or board normally is an
ex-officio body of state administrative officials, but in Michigan it is the state
board of canvassers, a bipartisan body appointed by the governor, and in Illi-
nois it is a special commisssion appointed by the governor from nominations
submitted by the major parties. The assumption appears to be that the special
commission rarely, if ever, will come into operation, because the legislature will
act rather than permit reapportionment to pass from its hands. This arrange-
ment currently prevails in California, Illinois, Michigan, Oregon, South Dakota,
and Texas."8
Four states have gone a step farther and completely removed the function
from the legislature. In Arizona the house districts are revised by county boards
of supervisors. In Arkansas it is performed by a board of apportionment, com-
prising the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general, and subject to
judicial review. In Missouri the senate is reapportioned by a special commis-
sion appointed by the governor, while the secretary of state reapportions House
seats among the counties and county boards draw districts within counties. In
Ohio the function is vested in the governor, secretary of state, and auditor, or
any two of them. 9
The latter arrangement appears preferable, because the legislature ought
not be obliged to become involved in this ticklish and somewhat technical matter.
Not only is it likely to consume much of the legislature's valuable time and en-
gender animosities, but members have such a direct personal interest that they
ought not, and should not be expected; to do it. Reapportionment ought to
be done by an agency which has no personal or political interest and which is
as insulated as possible from political pressures of any kind. The arrangements
in Arizona, Arkansas, Missouri, and Ohio are defective, because, although re-
apportionment has been removed from the legislature, the alternative boards
88 12 BOOK OF THE STATES 5-55 (1958-59).
89 Ibid,
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consist of political partisans who cannot be relied upon to take an entirely de-
tached and objective view.
Reapportionment should be executed not by a bipartisan board (and the
aforementioned states do not even assure that) but by an "unpartisan" agency.
This logical approach has been adopted by the United States Congress and the
British Parliament. Under the automatic apportionment act of 1929, the reap-
portionment of House seats is calculated after each census by the Census Bureau,
which transmits the results to the House, and the new apportionment applies
automatically to the subsequent Congress.9" The House of Commons has dele-
gated this task to special "boundary commissions," consisting of lay experts ap-
pointed by the Speaker of the House. "Mr. Speaker," a paragon of neutrality,
is chairman and the only ex-officio member.91
No existing agency in state government appears qualified to perform this
delicate function. It has been suggested that it be assigned to the state appellate
court, or that it appoint the members of a commission, but that proposal is open
to two criticisms: state appellate courts often are staffed by politicians, or at
least ex-politicians, and this is a nonjudicial function which courts might pro-
perly dislike.
Consequently it would be better to assign, by constitutional stipulation, this
function to a special apportionment commission composed of detached and
qualified people, and appointed by persons who also are nonpolitical, rather
than by the governor. The commission should hire a professional director and
such technical personnel as needed. The commission, of course, would be sub-
ject to mandamus and its work might properly be subject to judicial review.
The purpose should be not merely to secure regular reapportionment but to
secure good reapportionment. As Professor Seltzer states, "Action is not the
keynote of reform in reapportionment, but rather disinterested treatment of an
extremely important and vital problem." 92 Such a commission might properly
be charged also with redrawing congressional districts each decade.
XIV. A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
Consistent with the foregoing observations and data, the authors submit
the following proposal for amending the constitution of Indiana.
Sec. 4. The congressional districts and the districts for repre-
sentation in the House and Senate of the Indiana General Assembly
shall be revised in the year following the adoption of this amend-
ment, and subsequently every decade following each federal decen-
nial census, by a State Redistricting Commission.
Sec. 5. The State Redistricting Commission shall consist of one
person designated by the presidents of each of the four state univer-
sities and colleges from their respective faculties, of one person
designated by the president of the League of Women Voters of
Indiana, and of one person designated by the president of the Indi-
ana Bar Association. Commission members shall be designated with-
out reference to political party affiliation, and solely on the basis of
90 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1958).
91 House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats), 1948-49, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 66.
92 Seltzer, Rotten Boroughism in Indiana, 1952 (unpublished thesis in Indiana University
Library).
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professional ability and impartiality. Commission members shall re-
ceive compensation of $25 per day of actual service and shall hire a
professional director and such other personnel as needed, and fix
their compensation. The General Assembly shall appropriate an
amount adequate to enable the Commission to perform its duties ef-
fectively, provided that the appropriation for each redistricting shall
be not less than $50,000, and any unexpended amount shall revert
to the state general fund.
Sec. 6. The Commission shall redistrict on the basis of federal
census data and shall establish from 47 to 50 senatorial districts and
from 95 to 100 house districts, each district to have only one sena-
tor or one representative. Congressional and House and Senate dis-
tricts shall be formed of contiguous and compact territory. Each
class of districts shall be of equal population so far as possible, and
no congressional district shall deviate more than 15%, and no legis-
lative district more than 25%o, from the average population of dis-
tricts in its class. The Commission shall file with the Secretary of
State maps showing the new districts, which shall take effect at the
following election. The redistricting plans shall be subject to judi-
cial review to assure compliance with the aforementioned standards,
provided that no redistricting plan shall be subject to judicial re-
straint pending or during litigation. In the event any redistricting
plan shall be held invalid by the Supreme Court, the Commission
promptly shall prepare a substitute plan. Half of the senators
elected at the first election following a redistricting shall serve two
year terms. The Commission shall designate either the odd-num-
bered or the even-numbered districts for two year terms. If the
state legislature shall adopt any system of proportional representa-
tion or cumulative voting, the Commission may establish multi-
member districts.
Possibly alternative methods for constituting the commission could be de-
vised. The authors have selected the four presidents and the Bar Association
and League of Women Voters because of their impartiality. Any other state
officials or associations are unlikely to have as much objectivity. An even-num-
bered commission compels some agreement within the commission.
This proposal retains the two chambers at the present memberships; any
larger would tax the physical facilities; but allows some adjustment to facilitate
evenly populated districts. It eliminates multimember districts, for the reasons
stated above, except in the event the legislature should choose the Illinois cumu-
lative voting system or any variant of proportional representation. The standard
of a maximum deviation of 15% for congressional districts is not a difficult one,
but is difficult for legislative districting. Consequently a maximum deviation of
25% is permitted for legislative districts, although few need deviate more than
10%. Beyond this point it seems inadvisable to bind the discretion of the com-
mission.
XV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAL-REPRESENTATION
The theory of equal representation has been concisely stated by a state
jurist thusly:"
Equality of representation in the lawmaking tax levying bodies
93 Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 812, 40 S.W. 2d 315 (1931).
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is a fundamental requisite of a free government, and no unbiased,
fair, or just man has any right to claim a greater share of the voting
power of the people than is granted to every other man similarly
situated. It is vain for the people to hope for reform of abuses or
righteous results in legislation if the legislative bodies are not fairly
representative of the spirit, purpose, and will of all the people, with-
out discrimination.
The theory is grounded on the democratic concept of the moral equality of all
persons in a free government as expressed in the familiar expression "one man,
one vote." That democratic ideal, that all citizens should have equal represen-
tation, was developed in a bygone era of Jeffersonian individualism. This is the
era of group politics, but the notion still has relevance. The most obvious and
significant consequence of patterns of mal-representation in legislatures is the
unfair advantage afforded to favored groups to the disadvantage of other groups.
The system of representation is the distribution of the keys to power. It is evi-
dent that in Indiana the keys presently are not distributed equitably, and pro-
posals like the "federal plan" to make the legislature even less representative
would distribute the keys even less fairly.
The critical importance of an equitable distribution of the keys to power
in this age of group politics has been well stated as follows:9"
If it is true that in today's society the multiplicity of special
interests of the citizen is increasingly promoted and represented
through associations and organizations then it becomes even more
important that we have legislative bodies elected by voters of equal
weight so that one man's vote is no less or greater than that of any
other man. For if the Third House [lobbying] promotes the spe-
cial welfare of the individual then somewhere someone must pro-
mote the general welfare. With all of its imperfections a legislature
comprised of men of good will and elected from equal districts by
voters of multiple interests is apt to know best how to compromise
- special interests into the general welfare.
The foremost consequence of mal-representation then is its relation to the
policies enacted into law by the legislature. Politics is the process which deter-
mines who gets what, when, where, and how, and the system of representation
very largely determines who gets what. Even a casual observer of the Indiana
legislature in recent sessions can perceive the bearing of the existing pattern of
mal-representation on many of the most important decisions of the General
Assembly.
There are other important consequences of mal-representation which may
not be as obvious. One of the serious consequences in several states has been
its damage to the two-party system. To the extent that party alignments may
correlate with the areas which are over-represented as against those which are
under-represented, it is evident that one party is at a permanent disadvantage.
That party is doomed to being a minority permanently, or if it occasionally sur-
mounts the handicap, its legislative strength will be less than its proportionate
popular vote. The rationale of the two-party system is that the parties compete
for popular favor on an even basis. How meaningful is an election if one party
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is guaranteed in advance control of the legislature, or of one chamber, even if
a substantial vote is cast against it? "Yet such a result occurs in several Ameri-
can states with sufficient frequency to raise serious questions for a people that
supposedly profess democracy as a value system."95 Two related consequences
are the impact of mal-representation on intraparty structures and on executive-
legislative relations. Areas and interests which are underrepresented in the legis-
lature are likely to suffer a corresponding disadvantage in party councils and
nominations. States with pronounced mal-representation, such as the "federal
plan," virtually assure that the handicapped party will never control both cham-
bers, and governors from that party always will face a hostile senate or house,
thereby compounding the normal amount of friction inherent in the separation
of powers system.
Less tangible but of critical importance is the effect of mal-representation
on public confidence in state government. An unrepresentative legislature is
less responsive to public needs and wishes. While its influence cannot be segre-
gated or measured, indubitably this is one of the major reasons for the conspicu-
ous failure of state governments to adapt to contemporary needs, and the general
decline in the prestige of state legislatures. Movements for legislation to meet
the needs of our urban-industrial society, for constitutional revision, and for re-
form of the archaic structure of local government all too frequently have been
stymied in legislatures. Consequently in some states the public frequently has
made use of the initiative and referendum.
The other recourse available to the public is to turn to our national gov-
ernment. The unresponsiveness of state legislatures has contributed mightily to
the centralization trend, as interest groups, usually urban, have found Con-
gress more responsive. This fact led the recent federal Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations to urge "fair and equitable" reapportionment
of legislatures, stating, "The problem of reapportionment is important in
the area of study of this Commission because legislative neglect of urban
communities has led more and more people to look to Washington for more
and more of the service and controls they desire." 96
At this juncture some strong voices are urging by a specious appeal to tra-
dition that the Indiana legislature be made even less representative- perman-
ently. It might be wiser for Hoosiers to adhere to their constitutional tradition,
dating from the Northwest Ordinance, of equality of representation.
95 BAKER, op. cit. supra note 64, at 21.
96 H.R. Doc. No. 198, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1955).
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APPENmIx
LEGEND
Lake County
537.1 Est. population
in 1960 (000)
5 Representatives
1 joint repr.
594.7 Lake-Porter
district pop.
Ratio of representa-
tion in 1960: 46,856
Map 1.-Present House Districts. 1960 population estimates.
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LEGEND
Marion County
690.2 Est. population
in 1960 (000)
5 Senators
1 Joint senator
729.2 Marion-Johnson
district population
Ratio of representa-
tion in 1960: 93,712
Map. 2.-Present Senate Districts. 1960 population estimates.
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LEGEND
Lake County
12 Districts within
the county
44.8 Average district
population
Ratio of representa-
tion in 1960: 46,856.
Map 3.-Redistricted House on basis of 1960 population single member districts.
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LEGEND
Lake County
6 Districts within
the county
89.5 Average district
population
Ratio of representa-
tion in 1960: 93,712
Map 4-Redistricted Senate on basis of 1960 population single member districts.
